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Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to analyze state versus ethnic identification among
residents of Tibati, Cameroon, and to question whether identification suggests the
existence of tribalism. This study explores how residents of Tibati who more strongly
identify with their ethnic group than the state are more likely to express dissatisfaction
with the Cameroonian government, using information collected through informal
conversations about the level of satisfaction of Tibatians with regards to both their ethnic
group and the Cameroonian government.
This paper provides a synopsis of the major ethnic groups in Tibati and a brief
historical summary of Cameroonian state evolution from its independence in 1960 to the
present day. Using research gleaned through observation and conversation, this paper
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will reflect upon the political and ethnic sentiments of a mid-sized Cameroonian village
one year before its scheduled presidential election, to be held in 2011.
As a capstone paper is to be reflective of Peace Corps service, I will use both
qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection throughout this study, attempting
to balance first-person accounting with statistical data. This paper will lean on personal
experiences and observation as well as scholarly works. The finished product will,
hopefully, provide the reader with an understanding of the challenges that face
development workers in countries such as Cameroon, where promotion of state
development can become tangled with the preservation and progress of specific ethnic
groups. Two ethnic groups - the Fulbe and Mbororo people - will be detailed specifically
as they represent the majority throughout the Grand North and have a history of regional
political dominance.
I will discuss two projects that took place during my first year in Tibati. The first
project, an HIV/AIDS education campaign aimed at the creation of a network of peereducators, is being considered a success, for reasons I will delve into subsequently. The
second project, the creation of a community-based water pump committee charged with
raising necessary funds for construction costs of a new communal water pump, ended
unsuccessfully for reasons that will also be addressed later on in the paper.
Since achieving independence, the political evolution of the Cameroonian state has
been reminiscent of the growing pains endured by many other African states in the
decades following the end of the colonial period. Cameroon has had its own unique
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political history, which will be discussed throughout this paper.
Brief Political History
His tory of Cameroon

Known as ‘‘Little Africa’’ for encapsulating climates and ecosystems across the
entire continent (desert, rainforest, mountains and savannah) the country of Cameroon is
located on the West African coast, just north of the equator. Cameroon borders the
countries of Equatorial New Guinea, Gabon and Congo to its south, Chad and the Central
African Republic to its north and east, and Nigeria to its west. With a population of 18.8
million, Cameroon is slightly larger than the U.S. State of California in terms of
landmass, with approximately 183,000 square miles (Amin 1992).
Cameroon consists of ten regions, each with its own prefecture, religious and other
governing officials. The Adamaoua, southernmost region of Cameroon’s Grand North,
straddles north and south, and is an amalgamation of the country’s three distinct cultures:
that of the Grand North, Grand South (Francophone areas both) and the Anglophone
Western region. Ngaoundere, the capital of the Adamaoua region, is the terminus of
Cameroon’s railway system, which acts as a locus for commerce and provides the only
‘‘reliable’’ means of transportation between the Grand North and Grand South. The
Adamaoua is the second-least populous region in Cameroon, with large swathes of
untrammeled wilderness and yet-to-be-exploited natural resources. After centuries of
sustained civilization, Cameroon was discovered by the Portuguese in 1472, who
christened the area ‘‘Rio dos Camaroes’’ or ‘‘River of Prawns.’’ Cameroon was a German
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protectorate until after WWI, whereafter the League of Nations mandated shared
administration to Britain and France.
The French Cameroonian decolonization process of the early 1950s saw
unsuccessful uprisings among the Bassa and Bamileke peoples, led by the Union des
Populations du Cameroun (UPC). When Ahmadou Ahidjo came to power as the Frenchappointed Premier in 1958, the UPC continued its struggle for greater autonomy and was
harshly pacified by both the French and the new Cameroonian government. In 1961 a
referendum was held to determine the future for the Anglophone regions of the country.
The Northwest favored annexation to Nigeria, while the Southwest voted to remain part
of Cameroon, however the end result found both countries operating in an area of semiautonomy, considered the state of West Cameroon, a political entity lasting until 1966
following the merging of the major political parties between the two states. In 1972 - in
an effort to contain mounting dissatisfaction from Anglophone regions - Ahidjo signed
off on a new constitution, which explicitly abolished the creation of separate state
institutions and created a centralized administration. (Yenshu 2003).
Ahidjo was reelected for another five year term in 1975 - running unopposed - and
appointed Paul Biya as his prime minister the same year. Despite criticisms that the
Ahidjo administration had become an autocracy, the president won reelection - again
unchallenged - in 1980. Cameroon saw its first president resign for reasons of health in
1982, a move that transfered power into the hands of Paul Biya, who has ruled as
president ever since, though not without accusations of voting irregularities including
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gerrymandering and political thuggery (ACHPR 2002). Additional information about the
political evolution of Cameroon will be covered in subsequent sections.
It is worth mentioning that Ahidjo was of Fulbe descent, a point reflected in the
elite status enjoyed by Fulbe over his two-decade presidency. Massive public works
projects were undertaken throughout the Grand North during these years - especially in
the North Region capital of Garoua - however once Ahidjo had fallen from power the
funding was cut off and redirected to the Grand South. I believe this sense of pride especially throughout the Grand North, where Ahidjo was born and rose to eminence still very much exists in the mindset of rank and file Fulbe, and is double-edged in its
usefulness to the Fulbe people in terms of development.

The Peace Corps in Cameroon
Founded by President John F. Kennedy in 1961, the Peace Corps was founded with
the intent to send American men and women into developing countries to assist with
development. The organization was to promote goodwill and forge bonds of mutual
respect and understanding between the United States and the developing world at the
height of the Cold War. As with almost all development organizations, there have been
both supporters and critics of the Peace Corps throughout its lifespan. Some herald the
organization as the embodiment of the American spirit of generosity while others
consider it an organization comprised entirely of starry-eyed naive peaceniks whose
efforts only aid and abet corrupt, do-nothing governments. At the time of this writing
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there are many residents of Tibati who believe that the Peace Corps is, in actuality, a
wing of the Central Intelligence Agency or some other American cloak-and-dagger type
agency. I believe the truth lies somewhere in the middle (except for the CIA part.) Peace
Corps can, under the right circumstances, operate as a productive international
development agency, bringing hope and assisting in breaking the cycle of poverty that
exists in the majority of countries where the organization currently operates. Without
getting too far ahead of myself, I will address the positive and negative organizational
aspects of Peace Corps Cameroon more directly in a later section of this paper. Like any
entity that strives to better the public, constant scrutiny and revision is essential to keep
the institution viable.
Peace Corps volunteers first arrived to Cameroon in 1962 at the behest of the
Cameroonian government. At the time of this writing, a total of more than 2,700
Americans have served as volunteers in Cameroon, with the organization operating for 47
consecutive years, which one may or may not consider to be a point of pride. Four
projects exist, each overseen by an associate director of operations. These projects
include: agroforestry, health education, small enterprise development and education.
During the years of my service (2008-2010) there were around 140 volunteers working in
all ten of Cameroon’s regions, with an annual operating budget of about three million
dollars (Peace Corps 2008).

Rise of the Fulbe
Historians believe that the Fulbe peoples’ origins derive from either the Middle
9

East or North Africa; herdsmen who drove their livestock south in search of greener
pastures, establishing temporary settlements while rearing children and cattle along the
way. Other scholars pinpoint the area of Fuuta Toro, found in the valley of the Senegal
River, as the starting point for the Fulbe. What is undisputed is that the Fulbe controlled
wide swaths of highlands across present-day Guinea, Mali, Burkina-Faso, northern
Nigeria and northern Cameroon, where large numbers of cattle were shuffled from one
grazing area to the next as the nomadic herdsmen struggled to keep themselves viable in
the harsh climate of the Sahel region (Burnham 1996).
After a steady migration period to Lake Chad between the thirteenth and fifteenth
centuries, the Fulbe began to adhere to the Islamic law of Sharia. Faced with continual
subjugation at the hands of non-Muslims, unrest fomented. The Fulbe regarded the
ruling ethnicities as inferior, both in cultural and religious conviction. It is held that the
Fulbe conquest of northern Cameroon commenced in the early nineteenth century. Under
the leadership of Usman dan Fodio, the Fulbe organized a jihad against neighboring
pagan populations for the purposes of constructing an Islamic state (Burnham 1996). The
superiority of the Fulbe military, as well as the fractured tribal opposition, led to a nearcomplete dominance over northern Cameroon. Once in power, the Fulbe perpetuated
their stranglehold over the region through annual forced tributes of slaves and other
valuable goods, strengthening their legitimacy while marginalizing other ethnic
minorities from the political process (Gausset 1998).
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Mbororo

The Mbororo people are technically of Fulbe descent, yet exercise a culture
different enough to warrant their own sectional title. It is possible to accuse the presentday ‘‘Fulbe’’ as the group that has undergone the greatest transformation and therefore
are more deserving of a new title while the Fulbe were traditionally nomadic herdsmen,
centuries of settlements and changing economic habits have created a cleft in FulbeMbororo relations; the Mbororo continue to exist as herdsmen, as the Fulbe steadily
occupied positions of political power throughout Cameroon’s Grand North.
Tensions between Fulbe and Mbororo have increased with population density, with
land-use disputes erupting between Fulbe farmers and Mbororo herdsmen. In general,
the Fulbe regard their Mbororo cousins with a certain amount of disdain, critical of
Mbororo customs considered outmoded as well as perceived inattention to sharia, Islamic
law. In Tibati, this separation is acknowledged, if tacitly, by the population. Mbororo
men and women fulfill needed roles but are not accepted into the community proper. The
designation of ‘‘outcast’’ is certainly a stretch, however in terms of hierarchical
orientation, the Mbororo are considered second-class citizens both in Tibati and beyond
(Burnham 1996).
Today, the Mbororo of Cameroon’s Grand North share in the same agricultural
tradition of herding cattle for profit, with others serving as merchants and living in towns,
though the intermingling of Mbororo and other ethnic groups is a rarity in the village of
Tibati. Mbororo have strikingly unique physical characteristics that, when coupled with
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traditional dress, make their identification an incredibly simple process. Members of this
group tend to be taller and slimmer than others. They have narrow noses and a much
lighter skin pigmentation, which ethnographers have mistaken as a sign of Arabic
descent.
In Cameroon, the Mbororo practice of transhumance continues to clash with the
state’s preference for fixed agriculture; when Mbororo herd their cattle across the
countryside, in an effort to minimize overgrazing, there have been cases when the
Cameroonian government has reallocated their lands to other farmers. Herdsmen are
routinely fined by government officials for herding cattle through traditional
transhumance zones, underscoring the absence of communication between Mbororo and
the Cameroonian government. The MBOSCUDA (Mbororo Socio-Cultural and
Development Association), a Cameroonian organization of Mbororo pastoralists founded
in 1992 has expressed concern over what they consider to be institutionalized bias and a
larger government effort to dismantle their traditional cultural and economic customs
(IPACC, 2009). As Lake Chad continues to shrink, through over-exploitation and
climate change, delegates at the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues have
acknowledged the disproportionately negative impact on traditional fishermen and
farmers, however as of this writing, little action has been taken by the Cameroonian
government to address this period of uninterrupted marginalization.
Conflict in Chad and the Central African Republic has pushed Mbororo refugees
into Cameroon, threatening lives, cattle, property and the Mbororo culture. At first
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glance, the idea that a traditionally nomadic people could ever become displaced refugees
seems ironic, yet the Mbororo perhaps run the greatest risk of being locked into eternal
refugee status, as their lack of political representation allows the state to passively neglect
their rights and needs. Problems continue for the Mbororo, who continue to suffer
harassment at the hands of bandits operating between the Adamaoua and East Regions of
Cameroon and bordering CAR. The International Federation of the Red Cross reported
‘‘almost weekly’’ assaults, kidnappings and robberies of Mbororo refugees between the
years of 2004-2007.
The existing disconnect between Mbororo and the Cameroonian government
resembles the Australian government’s approach to its indigenous population. Both
Mbororo and the ‘‘Bushmen’’ of Australia share numerous similarities: an undereducated
population without legitimate political representation who, by all accounts, is at best
ignored and, at worst, excluded or persecuted for their perceived backwardness.

Current Ethnic & Political Landscape

Before beginning a study of ethnic identification, it would be useful to determine
what constitutes ‘‘ethnicity.’’ Weber describes ethnic groups as a segment of the
population who:

"entertain a subjective belief in their common descent - because of similarities of
physical type or of custom or of both, or because of memories of migration - in such
a way that this belief is important for the continuation of non-kinship, communal
kinship relationship... regardless of whether an objective blood relationship exists or
not" (Weber 1965).
13

Cameroon is one of the most ethnically diverse countries on the planet, with over
200 recognized ethnic groups present, depending on the source. While ethnic diversity
provides challenges to the development and growth of a state, it also makes a state more
impervious to civil war, one of the chief deterrents to economic growth and, by
extension, development. Some of the very same developmentally limiting aspects of
ethnic diversity in Cameroon - the unwillingness or inability to reach consensus and the
undisguised tribalism which on the national scale splinters political opposition so greatly
that electoral change becomes an impossibility - also safeguards against issues faced by
states with ethnic dominance, or those with only a handful of ethnic groups. The
consolidation of power into the hands of just a few groups is all but impossible in a place
as ethnically diverse as Cameroon; in addition, the practice of reassigning appointed
political figures to serve in areas where their ethnic group is in the minority is commonly
practiced by the Biya administration, which fears ethnocentricity as a potential vehicle of
its own displacement from power.
Statistically, African states with ethnic dominance are more at risk for civil war
(Collier 2007). This is because, it could be argued, that when enough people with
common ancestry find themselves in positions of authority, capable of bestowing
patronage and gerrymandering the political process, power becomes consolidated,
promoting tribalism. When affronted members of differing ethnicity become organized
enough to push back - as typified in the ethnically-fueled Rwandan genocide in the early
1990s - the preponderance for violent retribution becomes possible.
14

The wheels of change turn slowly in any democracy with an adequate system of
checks and balances; it is impossible for a president to ram through legislation in a
politically diverse congress and, therefore, a consensus-seeking political system is
wrought. In ‘‘broken’’ or ‘‘managed’’ democracies, consensus is not sought, as it does
not need to be. This is the same in autocracies, where the will of the exalted one is law.
While Cameroon is ethnically diverse, it is sorely lacking in viability of political choice.
In the most recent National Assembly Election, held in 2007, the Cameroon People’s
Democratic Movement (RDPC) - the party of President Biya - trounced four competing
parties by winning 153 out of a possible 180 seats. The next Presidential election, which
is scheduled for 2011, will once again feature Paul Biya, and barring any catastrophic
political occurrence he will handily win reelection. With the Assembly and Presidency
operating as one entity, the state of Cameroon is effectively being run as a dictatorship,
and an inefficient one at that. Cameroon is, relative to African standards, rich in natural
resources, especially when compared to the adjacent states of Chad and the Central
African Republic. This should be considered a blessing, however when analyzing
research compiled by economist Paul Collier (among others) with regards to ethnically
diverse democratic states, the window of development becomes smaller and, in actuality,
these very same resources can become a liability for economic growth. I would argue
that this is the case for Cameroon; the existence of resources has sustained the Biya
administration, for without the incentive of the international private sector to assist in the
development of Cameroon’s infrastructure and job creation, the corrupt ineptitude of the
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government would have resulted in its collapse.
Looking regionally, imposed segregation does not exist in Tibati or anywhere else
in Cameroon, however it is clear that ethnic groups cluster according to lineage, certainly
a non-phenomenal observation. Tibatians are no different from American Latinos,
Asians, African-Americans or Caucasians; more often than not members of ethnic groups
find greater kinship among peoples with shared histories and, thus, are more likely to
reside in pockets. The intangible, unspoken comfort witnessed in verbal and non-verbal
exchanges between fellow Haoussa or Baya, as two examples, illustrated this point.
Greeting and conversing with someone in their tribal patois is seen as a sign of respect, a
reality acknowledged and taken advantage of when it promoted the interests of projects.
Hostility amongst ethnic groups has a long history in Cameroon, with the most
recent flare-up occurring less than a decade ago 250 kilometers east of Tibati, in the town
of Meiganga, where Fulbe and Baya clashed violently for causes still not completely
understood. Casualties incurred on both sides of the ethnic divide. The conflict flared
out almost as quickly as it had begun and life quickly reverted back to normal, with
accounts as to which group emerged victorious differing greatly.
It is understood that civil war erodes the economic capacity of a country, and while
Cameroon is suffering due to the ineptitude and corruption of the Biya administration it
has remained intact since its inception, unlike many of Cameroon’s neighbors. It is often
easier to overthrow a government than to make it work properly, though it is difficult to
predict what sort of state Cameroon would resemble were Biya removed from office
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through popular uprising. The Cameroonian people have never known honest
democracy, shifting from colonial rule to the managed autocracy of today and, as such,
would have a difficult time at creating a representative government, given the
overwhelming diversity and underlying tribalism. Cameroonians, regardless of ethnicity,
are frustrated and exhausted with the blatant disrespect they receive from their
government, however the opposition is leaderless and, therefore, directionless.

Stratification of Government
Cameroon is divided into ten separate regions (though were referred to as
‘‘provinces’’ until late-2008.) They include: Extreme North, North, Adamaoua, Littoral,
East, Central, West, South, Northwest and Southwest (the final two regions comprising
Anglophone Cameroon, the former British colonies.) While perhaps lacking in creativity,
the names make finding each region easy on the map, and illustrate how professionally
segmented the country actually is.
Maneuvering through the twisty bureaucracy of Cameroonian politics is not
dissimilar from the American administrative structure; however the model is far less
abashed towards open displays of political corruption than our own. Each region has its
own governor, who is appointed by the president. Regions are comprised of districts,
each of which has its own ‘‘prefet’’ and ‘‘sous-prefet,’’ whom are appointed by the
region’s governor. The ‘‘prefet,’’ who acts something like a ‘‘mini-governor’’, is
responsible for appointment of delegates to each ministry within the district. The ‘‘sous-
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prefet’’ acts as assistant mini-governor. Imagine every possible public sector
responsibility you can: for every one there is a corresponding ministry. Electricity and
water, primary education, promotion of women and families, girls empowerment, public
works, sanitation, agriculture, small business development, transportation, employment,
etc. These midlevel bureaucrats each command a modest annual budget and are tasked
with keeping the government gears grinding.
Just like in American bureaucracy, there is mismanagement, waste and corruption,
however the extent of the negative is far more damaging to the lives of the Cameroonian
people, as indicated in the near non-existence of basic services. There is no organized
garbage collection or recycling programs for the majority of the country, roads are
dilapidated and routinely impassable during the rainy season, which lasts anywhere
between three to six months each year. Running water exists only in major cities;
electricity enjoys greater availability, though interruptions in service are commonplace.
Data Collection & Limitations

This study faced a serious number of limitations from the outset: namely that the
researcher was a Caucasian foreigner with limited conversational capacity in the national
language (French) and completely incapable of speaking any of the numerous ethnic
patois (Fulfulde, Baya, Haoussa, Mboum, Kole, etc.) Each of these limitations singularly
would make conducting social research difficult; together, it must be acknowledged,
created a situation where the reliability of research data is questionable. The challenges
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that accompanied these limitations are obvious and will only be touched upon here
briefly.
First, the issue of language proved to be not only detrimental to this study, but to
my work as a volunteer in total. Failure to adequately clarify what was the purpose of
this research ultimately proved to be a deal-breaker on countless occasions. Concerns
over anonymity and fear of reprisals more often than not trumped conversation with a
bearded stranger about identification to ethnicity and state. As mentioned in the section
on the history of Peace Corps in Cameroon, many Tibatians were (and continue to be)
convinced that our presence was somehow correlated to either an American or
Cameroonian intelligence agency, or perhaps both.
Cameroonian history, like the histories of many African states, is dominated by
European slave trading and colonialism. Some residents of Tibati lived in Cameroon
during its period as a French protectorate, which undoubtedly affected their responses to
questions by a Caucasian male. In a country where the overwhelming majority of
foreigners represent either missionaries or aid agencies, with a small number of big game
hunters and international investors, it is not difficult to understand the level of mistrust
that has carried over since the official terminus of Cameroon’s colonial period. My
‘‘whiteness’’ was detrimental in encouraging dialogue and it could be argued that even
those who did agree to exchange views were hesitant to reveal their true feelings about
the topics covered.
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Data Analysis
The data for this study was collected from conversations with residents of Tibati as
to whether they identified more strongly with their ethnic group, or with the State of
Cameroon. The residents of Tibati were all encountered in a public setting.
The key question of identification I was interested in exploring was: ‘‘Do you feel
more strongly connected to your ethnic group or the state of Cameroon?’’ During the
conversations, other questions were raised regarding more specific feelings with respect
to their ethnic group and the state.

Gender
Through conversations with fellow volunteers as well as observations in Tibati and
beyond, it is evident that a woman’s daily toil lasts many more hours per day than men,
being most often confined within the household due to the amount of work necessary to
care for a home and large family. Six to ten children per family is commonplace; as an
extreme example, the father of a Tibati acquaintance, has three wives and has reared 22
children at the time of this writing. Although he is currently in his mid-eighties, his
younger wives could conceivably still conceive.

Ethnicity
Unsurprisingly, the majority of people I talked to identified as Fulbe, more than the
following two ethnic groups combined, which were Mboum and Baya . Boute and
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Haoussa rounded off the top five most represented ethnic groups. The remaining
ethnicities - seventeen different groups all told - comprised a small number. The fact that
I was able to talk to people from 22 different ethnic groups underscores the diversity of
Cameroon as a whole, as well as the challenge of finding commonality of interest over
such a wide ethnic swath.
When parsed out according to the top three represented ethnic groups (Fulbe,
Mboum and Baya, respectively), the results of my observations reveal some interesting
contrasts amongst these peoples. Beginning with the Fulbe, more than half selected
ethnic group as their identification, with a third for the state. Based on observational data
and conversations with Fulbe residents of Tibati, as well as upon their historical
dominance until the resignation of President Ahidjo, it is not surprising that these people
consider their ethnicity with a strong amount of pride. I would argue that if the same
Tibati residents who responded ‘‘state’’ were questioned more directly about the Biya
administration, contrasted with Ahidjo as a way of establishing a retroactive job approval
rating, it would reveal that their idea of ‘‘state’’ is neither inclusive nor supportive of Paul
Biya's presidency. In essence, Fulbe are prideful of the Cameroon of the 1960's and 70's,
when the country was being run by a member of their own tribe.
Mboum participants were split down the middle, half identifying with their ethnic
group and half state. Like the Fulbe, Baya participants more strongly identified with their
ethnicity (approximately half) than the state (about one-quarter). Interestingly, a third of
Baya people provided no response to this question, an enormous percentage for which I
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have no informed explanation.

Strength of Ethnic Group Identification
I asked participants to indicate how strongly they identified with their ethnic group,
with responses highlighting the intense attachment Tibatians have with their ethnic group.
Around three-fourths of responses were along the lines of "strong" attachment, contrasted
with only a few people providing anything resembling a "weak" attachment.

Strength of State Identification
Only about a third of Tibatians I spoke with displayed a strong identification
toward the state. In contrast to ‘‘ethnic identification", this shows the intensity of
disconnect Tibatians feel toward the state of Cameroon. Considering Cameroon’s history
of political repression, it is reasonable to assert that Tibatians would have felt compelled
to rate their identification toward state higher, fearing retribution. A similar case could
be argued for ‘‘ethnic identification’’, however observational data and interviews
conducted throughout the course of my first year in Tibati suggest otherwise. I have
found overall that Tibatians are far more distrustful and fearful of their government than
members of their ethnic group, for understandable reasons when one reflects upon the
harsh political tactics employed by the Biya administration following the contested
elections of 1992 and 1997. I was told by a number of Tibatians that the RDPC only
visits Tibati during the run-up to an election, when party members will give sacks of rice,
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flour and bars of soap to villagers in an effort to curry favor. Perhaps even most tragic is
the willingness of some Tibatians - citizens who despise the Biya administration and
speak out virulently about the state of Cameroonian politics behind closed doors - to
appear supportive of the RDPC: wearing its traditional garb, handing out favorable
literature, parading around in the annual celebratory events, all because those who
participate receive a small amount of money by party members.
In short, only a small percentage of Tibatians displayed honest identification toward
the RDPC - which, for all intents and purposes, is the state - raising questions about the
feasibility of partnership between the international community and the Cameroonian
government. And, as a Peace Corps volunteer who is considered a guest of the state, how
is it possible to work with a population that is turned off from its government? And,
furthermore, how can honest development work take place in a country where disconnect
between citizen and state is so pronounced?

Confidence in Ethnic Group versus Cameroonian Government
Of the people I talked to, approximately two thirds have strong confidence in their
ethnic group, and less than ten percent with weak confidence. Similarly, one third has
strong confidence in the state government, and one third weak confidence. Overall, my
impression from talking to the people of Tibati is that they have a bias favoring their
ethnic group over the Cameroonian government in terms of confidence.
I believe, by and large, that the people of Tibati took the issue of ‘‘confidence’’ to
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mean trustworthiness. Their responses paint an unfavorable picture for the amount of
trust Cameroonians place within their government. Undoubtedly, some likely reflected
upon perceived slights and moments of generosity from members of their shared
ethnicity, while others viewed the question as more of a referendum on the government’s
inability or unwillingness to address the systemic poverty that exists in Tibati.

Identification
When I asked people the question ‘‘Do you have a stronger identification with your
ethnic group or to the state of Cameroon?’’ approximately half indicated their ethnic
group, and about one third indicated the State of Cameroon. These responses reinforce
the overall impression of my observations: Cameroonians are more likely to identify
with, and have confidence in, their ethnic group versus the state.
As touched upon in the Strength of State Identification, I believe that taking the
time to study and question the dichotomy between state and ethnic identification provided
my projects with a more personal understanding of the sentiments of the average
Tibatian, with respect to their government and, by extension, its efforts at development.
What I discovered, which will be covered further in a concluding section of this paper, is
that ethnocentrism was not a strong enough deterrent to preclude my engagement with
the community as a whole. Tibatians wanted what was best for the community, and
would accept help from any person or organization - regardless of ethnicity - if it was
promising a better tomorrow.
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Project One: Education Campaigns
During the first year of service, my counterpart Abdoul Sattari and I quickly
established working relationships with two institutions that might have more in common
with one another than obvious at first glance. Several projects were conducted with
students at the Bilingual High School and convicts at the Tibati Correctional Center, each
with their own challenges and successes.

Tibati Correctional Center
Within the second or third month, we had begun to teach weekly business classes at
the Tibati Correctional Center that were reasonably well received, which is to say neither
of us were shanked and the student attendance was consistent. The average number of
prisoners floats around 100 at any given time, and while specific charges were never
inquired about, it was established that petty crimes - mostly theft and assault - were par
for the course. The population of the Greater Tibati area is approximately 35,000, and so
100 prisoners might appear disproportionate, however the prison actually served the
entirety of the District Djerem, which includes the large city of Ngaoundal.
While working in the prison, it was surprising to see such a large number of Baya,
who are not a major ethnic group in Tibati. Working with this preliminary observation, it
appeared that there was an ethnic bias against the Baya, or that the Baya were
disproportionately turning to criminal activity for some reason, or that they were simply
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terrible criminals. This apparent overrepresentation of Baya proved itself out once it was
discovered that the prison population included Ngaoundal, which is majority Baya.
The class met each Thursday - preferably before the sun had a chance to start
injuring people - using the Peace Corps designed ‘‘12-Week Business Course,’’ which
has been employed by Small Enterprise Development volunteers with positive results.
Without dwelling too long on the nuts and bolts of the class work itself, we were
pleasantly surprised at the sustained level of interest on the part of the students, and were
encouraged to plan further sessions. During the first week it became apparent that
external funding would be needed, as the students were without pens, notebooks, chalk or
a chalkboard, so we presented the project to the Lamido of Tibati who graciously agreed
to fund the effort. Although the sum was quite small - only around eighty USD - the
Lamido could have just as easily given the brush-off.
It might be helpful here to provide a better description of life inside the correctional
center: The prison is one large structure, shaped like a brick and equally as inviting as a
prospective living space. Upon entering, one is faced with an open courtyard around 20 x
100 feet in area. This space is mixed-use, invisibly compartmentalized into spaces for
cooking, praying, clothes-washing and drying, general horseplay, a barbershop and, in
our case, a classroom. Along the same wall as the entrance, there is a water pump
adjacent to an unsanitary bathroom and showers, two rooms with concrete floors and
drainage holes. Across the courtyard are three sleeping chambers, where the men are
forced to lie pressed up against one another due to the severity of overcrowding. The dry
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season converts the main courtyard into an open-air sleeping area, though during the
rainy season (extending from late-April until early-November) the prisoners are without
this option. Realistically the prison houses forty men, though as mentioned above this
number is always more than double and sometimes triple capacity. A 2002 study
conducted by the African Commission on Human Rights reported a nation-wide prison
overcrowding rate exceeding 450% its planned capacity. In Douala, the prison was built
to house 182 inmates, holding 2,396. The central prison of Yaounde was no better,
holding 3,059 persons with a planned capacity of 870 (ACHPR 2002). Though this study
is eight years old, the inhumane conditions found in Cameroonian prisons continues.
The reasons for overcrowding in Cameroonian prisons are similar to those in the
American system: inadequate funding for facility expansion, trivial crimes leading to
prison sentences and an overstretched judiciary unable to keep pace with processing
paperwork in either a professional or timely manner. Individual prisoners commonly
become lost in the system and without adequate funds and pressure by external forces end
up trapped in the prison months, sometimes even years, longer than their original
sentence. The International Center for Prison Studies reported that Cameroon had the
second highest rate of occupancy, with around one-half awaiting trial proceedings.
It is easy to sympathize with the inmates, not only because - according to the
inmates themselves - everyone is innocent, but because even in the cases where an
accused perpetrator did perpetrate the perpetration, the sub-human conditions of the
prison make the punishment outweigh the crime. Each inmate is allotted one meal of
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couscous and leafy sauce per day, and is forced to rely, when possible, upon family
members to bring food, clothing and personal hygiene articles, which are only admitted
to the inmates following the paying of a bribe. Malnourishment is a serious problem
among inmates, as is the inadequacy of healthcare. Because of the lack of sanitation and
close quarters, disease spreads quickly: upon questioning, several inmates reported
outbreaks of scabies, tuberculosis and several sexually transmitted diseases. Bringing
this to the attention of the prison doctor proved fruitless; he stated that no medicine was
available for the inmates, due to withholding of funds by the federal government.
As has been discussed, Anglophone and Francophone areas exist within Cameroon.
Due to this fact, two penal codes exist as well; both the common law ‘‘Penal Code’’
(practiced in former British regions) as well as the ‘‘Criminal Prosecution Code’’ (applied
in Francophone regions), comprising an at-times confusing, dual legal standard. Legal
assistance is technically provided for those unable to afford council, however this does
not exist in practice. If you are misfortunate enough to find yourself arrested and charged
with a crime, yet unable to pay for a lawyer, you are forced to defend yourself in court.
As one would assume, individuals without working knowledge of the legal system make
for rather terrible lawyers, which is why those with means pay people who have studied
the law to defend them. Another glaring irregularity within Cameroonian law is the
ability of certain authorities (governors, prefets, sous-prefets and district chiefs) can
legally detain an individual under police custody for up to fifteen days, an action that can
then be renewed indefinitely (ACHPR 2002).
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Without reform, the Cameroonian prison system will become more and more
dilapidated, prisoners will continue to be treated as sub-human, and the government will
be faced with two options: either build more prisons or loosen legal statutes. It is
unfortunate that the government lacks the will necessary to move toward rehabilitation
versus simple incarceration, as the majority those imprisoned in Tibati being between the
ages of 18-30, young enough to positively impact their communities, if provided the
opportunities. As will be discussed in the following section, the majority of
Cameroonians are under the age of 16, a troubling statistic when considering the quality
of public education and the availability of employment opportunities. Young,
unemployed, undereducated men are a common proponent of civil unrest and, perhaps
less dire, violent and non-violent crime.
In terms of ethnocentrism within the prison, I did not encounter any overt cases of
tribalism, either through informal conversations or observation, though I imagine that the
prisoners were likely segregating themselves according to regional familiarity, which
would unconsciously stratify into ethnicity. Prisoners from Ngaoundal (overwhelmingly
Baya) would be more likely to associate with one another versus those raised in Tibati
(overwhelmingly Fulbe.) The American prison system can be viewed through a much
starker ethnocentric lens, simply because the variety of skin pigmentation allows for the
appearance of greater segregation; in the Tibati prison, where the population was entirely
Cameroonian, the obviousness of segregation is less pronounced.
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Bilingual High School
This project began as a straightforward educational campaign when I was
approached by Abdoulhai Bobbo, a local small business owner who knew of my work as
a health educator. Bobbo had ten high-school aged boys who were interested in
becoming peer-educators, and he asked for me to teach course material, lead discussions
and facilitate group meetings. My counterpart, Abdoul Sattari, and I eventually shifted
the peer-educator program over from this smaller setting to the local bilingual high
school, which will be detailed shortly.
Using educational materials provided by Peace Corps, we launched a peereducators campaign involving high school students throughout Tibati. These students
received formalized training on subjects including sexual anatomy, the biology behind
the HIV/AIDS virus and other sexually transmitted infections (STIs,) the methods of
preventing the transmission of sexual infections (abstinence, fidelity and condoms,)
responsible sexual comportment and treatment options. The peer-educators reviewed and
discussed various ‘‘at-risk’’ scenarios, which included situations involving drug and
alcohol use, prostitution, sexual violence and norms, teen pregnancy and peer pressure.
Myths surrounding HIV/AIDS and other STIs were debunked and each peer-educator
explained proper prophylaxis use through demonstrations involving an expired condom
and an impressively carved wooden penis. After viewing a session, peer-educators would
lead the next meeting, teaching the material back to their fellow educators. It was
through this process that the group gained public speaking skills, confidence and
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experience.
This first effort gradually petered out, as the school year started. Pleased with what
we considered to be overall success with this small group, Abdoul and I decided to
continue this peer-education project by working with the ‘‘Croix Rouge Health Club’’ at
the local bilingual high school. By broadening the scope of the project, we were able to
directly educate a greater number of students who, in turn, will use their experiences to
educate fellow students, siblings and parents. Working with high school students
provided challenges and payoffs, culminating with World AIDS Day, occurring on the
first day in December. With our peer-educators we presented condom demonstrations
from classroom to classroom, ultimately acquainting several hundred students with
proper condom use before day’s end.
Although I was not expecting to find examples of ethnocentricity, nowhere during
my time working at the Tibati public high school did I notice any existing tribalism; the
students treated one another much in the same way as students the world over, the same
being said for interactions involving teachers and staff. The absence of ethnocentrism
could be a result of the relative effectiveness of the public school, combined with an utter
lack of alternative. While I am unaware of exact statistics, the high dropout rate of
Cameroonian students is evident, with parents who might otherwise prefer to segregate
their students according to ethnicity are unable to do so. What does exist, however, are
schools divisible by religion, from primary to high school level. A longitudinal study of
the ethnic sentiments of students would be interesting in determining at what age
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tribalism begins to emerge in Tibati, if at all.

Project Two: Water Pump Committee
The second of my first two major projects conducted within the first year of service
revolved around the formation of a water pump committee, whose task it was to raise
public funds for the construction of a new water pump. After conducting needs
assessment sessions with local leadership in the Panyere Quarter of Tibati, it was
determined that the lack of potable water presented the most pressing concern, and the
construction of a new public water pump necessary.
At the onset of this project, one foot-pedal public water pump served the families of
around one-hundred homes in the quarter. During peak hours of use, an individual might
wait up to one hour to fill a single five-gallon jug with water to be used for cooking,
cleaning of the home and clothing, washing and drinking. We were informed by local
leaders that the next closest public water source was a public well around one kilometer
away from the quarter’s center. Another option is the Panyere River, also around one
kilometer away, posing the risk of any number of waterborne diseases, as it is used as
everything from a car wash, laundromat, public bathtub and latrine. Roaming herds of
cattle, goats and sheep also drink, urinate, defecate, bleed and probably die daily in the
Panyere. In addition to serious health risks, including the possibility of amoebas,
hepatitis, typhoid fever, cholera, giardia, schistosomiasis and dysentery, the amount of
time and effort expended by hauling a relatively small amount of water the distance of
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one kilometer emphasized the need for more options.
The pump project was decided upon entirely by community leaders following a
needs assessment. There were approximately thirty-five members - all men - who
participated in this first meeting. The men comprising this group were of varied
ethnicity: Mboum, Haoussa, Fulbe and others, signifying an absence of tribalism; these
men were willing to work together toward a singular goal that would benefit their
community as a whole, the only noticeable discrepancy being the homogeneity of their
religion, that is, Muslim. Elections were held during the same session, with positions of
president and vice-president, secretary, treasurer, sergeant-at-arms and a host of assistants
with slightly differing titles. Unaware of the true costs of constructing a water pump, we
estimated a need for 2,000,000 CFA, the equivalent of $4000 USD. It was estimated that
a total of 200 families lived in the quarter, with the amount of 500 CFA to be collected
each month from each family. 500 CFA is one American dollar, and is the price of one
beer or carbonated beverage; this amount was also agreed upon by the group members as
a reasonable request. If 100,000 CFA were collected each month, we estimated that
along with funding from the Lamido, Mayor or some other political leader or leaders, we
would be able to begin construction after six to eight months. All funds would be placed
into a bank account at the microcredit institution in Tibati, with the President and
Treasurer being the only individuals with access to the funds.
The first tangible step was to promote the project to the residents of the quarter.
We wanted to determine the actual number of families in the area, as well as whether the

33

500 CFA ask per month was realistic. Community canvassers were selected and
provided information-gathering survey forms, and were asked to conduct a house by
house survey. We estimated that following two weeks of data collection, the canvassers
would have sensibilized residents to the proposed project, and determined a factual
number of families within the quarter: This is where the project began to break down.
After two weeks had elapsed, we were no closer to determining the number of
families within the quarter, nor had any progress on informing the community about the
project been made. When asked, the arrival of seasonal rains was given as primary
reason for the failure to begin - or for that matter, complete - the data collection process.
While the ‘‘rainy season’’ does make outdoor work difficult and unattractive, the rains in
Tibati were nothing resembling monsoons; on average, rains arrived every other day,
usually in the afternoon and never for more than an hour at any one time. As I have
continued my service, it became apparent that rainstorms were used as an excuse by
many Tibatians to stay inside and put off obligations, even if the storm had ended an hour
before. Tromping through the muddy streets is not fun for anyone, however the
frustration felt when realizing that our meeting had been canceled because of a rain
shower that ended an hour beforehand was immensely difficult to handle, coming from
the faster-paced work environment of the US.
In short, the project steadily declined, until it was eventually abandoned by all
parties. In an effort to drum up community support, my counterpart and I scheduled a
meeting with the delegate to the department of water and electricity; this was incredibly
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unsuccessful, as the first question asked by the delegate was: "And who will be your
external funder?" When we attempted to explain that this project would be addressed by
the public - a communal solution to a communal problem - we were laughed out of his
office. The area within Tibati that was to benefit from this project was never an issue,
leading me to believe that the delegate harbored no ill will toward any specific ethnic
group.

Effectiveness of Peace Corps Cameroon
With any international development effort, objectively questioning the purpose,
effectiveness in assistance deliverance and the sustainability of this assistance is essential
in gauging its legitimacy, and Peace Corps Cameroon is no exception. As stated earlier
in this paper, Peace Corps Cameroon has operated uninterrupted since 1962, a record for
sequential years of service. Development does not, of course, occur overnight; however
the American taxpayer would be remiss not to ask about the accomplishments of any
development organization that has operated in any country for forty-seven straight years.
Two questions overshadowed my service. First: What does Peace Corps Cameroon have
to show for its efforts? And secondly: Is our presence accomplishing Peace Corps’ stated
objectives of providing Cameroonians with technical skills and sharing in meaningful
cross-cultural exchange? Only able to account for operational procedures from 20082010, this analysis cannot be viewed as an overall assessment of the entirety of our
presence in Cameroon, however I believe criticism of both positive and negative aspects
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of Peace Corps’ approach to assisting in the development of Cameroon is possible, these
aspects being systemically perpetuated.
Peace Corps employs a good number of Cameroonian nationals, providing a stable
salary, benefits and, in some cases, intellectual workplace satisfaction. These individuals,
ranging from drivers and cleaning staff to petty officers and assistant program directors,
all have families who are supported economically through our organization, certainly a
positive aspect.
For volunteers who make the effort to learn the language, immerse themselves
within their surrogate communities, Peace Corps can be an experience of incredible selfdevelopment. The overwhelming majority of volunteers are recent college graduates,
with a median age of around twenty-four, some of whom are leaving the nest for the first
time. Volunteers learn resourcefulness and perseverance, gaining perspective of how the
developing world actually exists outside the pages of texts and beyond the walls of
classrooms. In turn, Cameroonians have the opportunity to engage Americans, learning
more about our culture which is predominately known only through movies and
television shows. The cross-cultural exchange shared through Peace Corps’ presence is
perhaps its strongest, most positive attribute.
Programmatically, the service of a single volunteer has the capacity to educate and
ameliorate the lots of scores of Cameroonians, improving understanding of technological
and methodological advancements in the areas of public health and agroforestry, as well
as new business techniques, all beneficial for any community, when projects are
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conducted properly, which is typical. Volunteers receive no budget and must rely upon
the good works of Cameroonians and the charity of local politicians to accomplish any
project requiring funding; in essence, we are told to ‘‘run with the ball’’ but are given no
ball, which limits the scope of what volunteers can conceivably accomplish. Even a
small amount of discretionary funds would greatly improve the prospects of a volunteer’s
service, and while domestic programs such as AmeriCorps similarly withhold individual
budgets from its volunteers, comparing development resources - such as photocopiers,
computers, access to educational information and private citizens with the time and
motivation to assist volunteers - between the two organizations is ludicrous. It is easier to
organize and commence projects with nothing in America than in the developing world,
because our definition of ‘‘nothing’’ is drastically different from that of the developing
world.
While supportive of the public health, agroforestry and small enterprise
development programs, I have struggled to understand the legitimacy of the education
program, which sends dozens of volunteers to schools throughout Francophone regions
with the primary objective of teaching English to high school students for two years.
Cameroon is, as has been mentioned, a bilingual country (French and English) equipped
with more than enough trained-English teachers to satisfy the needs of its schools.
Simply put, the education program takes jobs away from qualified Cameroonian teachers,
thrusting predominantly young American men and women - many of whom are without
any formal training in education - into classrooms where they are largely unable to
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command enough of the students’ respect to be effective. The moral and satisfaction of
education volunteers is significantly lower than volunteers in any other program, as
evidenced by the higher rates of early termination (when a volunteer elects to end service
before close of service) witnessed during my service.
Individual motivation plays entirely too large a part of whether a volunteer’s
service is productive or not. It is asinine to assume that every individual has the skills
necessary to be a productive volunteer, just as with any other profession. The same
tangible and intangible components that combine to create a successful doctor, airplane
technician or state senator determine the success of each volunteer. Some people are cut
out for international development, while others are not, a point which would not be
problematic if consequences for shoddy work performance existed. Accountability
among volunteers is seriously lacking in Peace Corps Cameroon, the responsibility of
which can be partly attributed to the diffuseness of the administration, coupled with the
difficulties of travel throughout most of the country, as well as a low administrator-tovolunteer ratio (1:25). There are not enough mid-level bureaucrats to ensure
productivity; our organization could be compared to an army comprised of nothing but
generals and privates, lacking officers with their carrots and sticks.
The feeling of isolation is felt more strongly for volunteers who live in the Grand
North, who must endure a fourteen-hour train ride to Yaounde, where Peace Corps
Cameroon’s headquarters is located. At the time of this writing, Peace Corps Cameroon
has been without a Country Director for nearly three months. Peace Corps is
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bureaucratic and, like most bureaucracies, it becomes difficult to dislodge an
underperforming employee. Though I shudder at the thought of what a privatized
development model might resemble, there is little doubt that many volunteers would be
rightfully given their walking papers, were our administration not as squeamish about
disciplining, suspending or outright terminating certain volunteers who accomplish little
to nothing with a bizarre sense of self-righteous pride.
It has become evident that the number of volunteers serving in Cameroon will see a
serious influx over the next two years, with some estimating that the total number will
more than double, creating a wonderful opportunity with significant challenges. While
more volunteers means that our organization will have the capacity to impact a greater
number of lives, without an adequate system of quality control these additional men and
women run the risk of underutilization. Peace Corps Cameroon has the potential to
achieve great things on behalf of the Cameroonian people, however it is presently lacking
in the necessary administrative leadership.

Conclusions
Based on the information collected in this study, ethnic groups are still considered
important institutions in the village of Tibati - for reasons stemming from dissatisfaction
with the Cameroonian government - however there were no observable cases of overt
tribalism. If Tibatians are harboring ethnic resentments they are doing so passively or
unconsciously. The only ethnic tension witnessed during the 13 months spent gathering
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observational data was between two groups of children (one Baya, the other Fulbe) who
were between the ages of eight and twelve; these children would taunt and occasionally
fight one another, though nothing too violent in nature. One assumes that these perceived
differences were cultivated at home, by either parents or elder siblings, as ethnic
prejudice does not create itself.
Ethnocentrism does not appear to be the driving factor in identification; however,
based on conversations with residents, there is an obvious lack of trust on the part of
Tibatians toward the Cameroonian government. Because the government is regarded so
poorly, it should not be surprising that the idea of state identification is met with mistrust,
a negative relationship that will fester as long as the government continues to ignore the
needs and wants of the citizenry. By and large, Cameroonians are not ignorant to what
many international aid agencies and transparency organizations already know: the
government is at present hopelessly corrupt, and is unlikely to change in the near future.
When questioned as to how the populous might create formative change within
Cameroon, the overwhelming response was that it would be best to wait until Paul Biya is
dead. It is a sorry state of affairs when those dissatisfied with the performance of their
government have assuaged their fears with the eventual death of their autocratic leader.
As Biya’s health continues to deteriorate (it is already seen as in decline), the hopes and
expectations of the Cameroonian people for the arrival of a new day will intensify. I
believe these hopes to be unrealistic; it is in my estimation that the death of Biya - if he
has not already privately handpicked his successor - will result in the smooth transition of
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power. The RDPC (Biya’s ruling party) will find a new leader and retain its stranglehold
over the electoral process.
For Cameroon to improve its international status, systemic change from within is
critical. The country has many assets; its relatively long history of peacefulness is chief
among them. Cameroon is a beacon of stability in the otherwise tumultuous Central
African region; this is of overwhelming benefit to the political and economic progress of
the country and should be vigorously guarded. International investment - integral to
development as it is considered today - will come to those countries with resources and
stability, of which Cameroon reigns regionally. However, due to the corruption of the
government, Cameroon has not - nor will it ever - reach its potential. Through a
specifically targeted social mobilization campaign, it would be possible to bend the
government to a position more directly beneficial to the population. Social mobilization
can be credited to a host of advancements throughout Cameroon’s history, namely the
creation of Cameroon as a multiparty state, which came about through organized - and
peaceable - political opposition. What Cameroon currently lacks is leadership, which, as
exemplified by John Fru-Ndi, the former vegetable salesman who organized the Social
Democratic Front party (SDF) and became the greatest challenger to Paul Biya, can come
from nearly anywhere.
While issues such as war, famine, human rights abuse, environmental degradation
and the spread of HIV/AIDS dominate most conversations about the condition of subSahara Africa, government corruption is attributable to the promulgation of these
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problems and is just as important as any on the list above. Corruption is a demoralizing
force, eroding citizens’ faith in their institutions, creating a climate of malaise and
hopelessness. When a people stop believing in their government, the willingness to place
faith and to work with political institutions flies out the window. Development work is
severely undermined by a corrupt government, as the positive impact of international aid
programs is nullified when leaders unabashedly skim off project financing to line their
own pockets and those of their allies. When an organization provides funds and expertise
for an infrastructural improvement campaign - a road and bridge building project, for
example - it creates a contract with the state government, forcing it to promise to allot a
certain amount of monies for annual upkeep of the project. The diffuse nature of subSaharan bureaucracies allows for mismanagement and ‘‘disappearance’’ of earmarked
funds and, as a result, the roads and bridges become neglected and eventually impassable,
wasting the time and funds of the development agency and creating a situation where the
agency is mistrustful of the government and, as such, unwilling to provide assistance in
the future. When roads and bridges are unusable, it is not the government officials who
suffer; it is the citizens whose quality of life diminishes.
Without private sector growth a state will never move beyond its present economic
status, and the disincentive hurdles erected by many sub-Saharan governments have
driven away prospective investment - and therefore job creation - in the country, once
again most negatively affecting the citizenry. In an article published by the Wall Street
Journal in 2009, Dambisa Moyo, a former economist at Goldman-Sacs, argues that
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embezzlement and political corruption are indeed knee-capping the growth of African
states, however the aid itself is also detrimental to the economic vibrancy of a state.
Large injections of foreign aid have effectively created a welfare-continent, where
ingenuity and the entrepreneurial spirit have been replaced by a placid, disinterested
political environment that has become dependent on international assistance to meet and
solve its problems.
According to Transparency International, a corruption watch-dog organization,
24% of people polled in sub-Sahara Africa reported paying a bribe at some point during
2009. Compare this with a mere 2% of those polled in North America. The same study
reported more than 50% of poll respondents living in Cameroon, Liberia, Sierra Leone
and Uganda reported the paying of a bribe in 2009, each of them in sub-Sahara Africa.
When such open, unapologetic corruption becomes normalized in the mindset of
authority figures it permeates into the folds of a country’s social fabric, where everyone
is trying to chip away from everyone else. It becomes easy for a policeman or
schoolteacher to justify the asking for a bribe when they have not been paid in months or
sometimes years, due to corruption at an even higher level. The international community
needs to demand greater accountability before providing aid; if not, the cycle of corrupted
leaders and impoverished states will continue.
In terms of Tibatian ethnocentrism in relation to development, I believe there is
much substantive data that could be collected and distilled. The location of the village,
the variety of ethnic groups, the intermeshing of Anglophone and Francophone
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Cameroon and its relative isolation makes Tibati an excellent place to conduct social
research. I will advance several areas of future research in the following section.
To put a finer point on this conclusion, I believe it is the ineptitude and corrupt
nature of the government that has necessitated the reliance upon the ethnic group for both
financial and emotional support. The government has created a vacuum of confidence, a
role that the ethnic group has filled, though this is not synonymous with the existence of
tribalism - at least not in Tibati - and if any sort of segregation does exist in the village it
is of a religious nature.

Future Research
Throughout the course of this study numerous areas for continued research came to
mind. Cameroon is a fascinating country - especially so for social researchers - and the
opportunities are many. Perhaps the next most logical step would be in determining
specifically why ethnic groups are more deserving of confidence. Are there tangible
grievances against the Cameroonian government that are pushing citizens away from
trusting their government, or are the reasons more historic in nature? The responses to
these questions could assist a government interested in improving its stature in the eyes of
its people; however the present administration seems unlikely to implement changes that
might improve its popularity.
This report would have been complemented by a study of specific interests of
individual ethnic groups, as well as the prevalence of commonality of interest within
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specific interest groups. Development organizations would benefit from a quantitative
system of determining interest across ethnic lines, which could be easily assessed by a
field researcher who knew what questions to ask. Time, funding and energy could be
saved if consensus on the importance of specific projects was wrought; I believe
downplaying the importance or necessity of ethnic groups is possible when individuals
become aware of shared needs and wants.
Perhaps more theoretically, a study of how members of specific ethnic groups
define ‘‘development’’ and an examination of the Cameroonian idea of ‘‘statehood’’
along ethnic lines could shine a light on the fractious political reality in the country. It is
logical to assume that once the government begins to provide reasons for the people to
place their faith within, a dual-pronged approach of revitalizing the infrastructure
accompanied with a top-down reclamation of government agencies - stressing
transparency and accountability in the Assembly, executive and judicial branches - would
begin the slow process of rebuilding trust in government.
A system of ranking individual job performance of appointed and non-appointed
political leaders (president, prefet, sous-prefet, mayor, lamido, etc.) could, if published,
help the populous put pressure on political appointers - and themselves - to change the
individual political actors and perhaps even the responsibilities of these actors. Though
this would certainly be resisted by lawmakers - for when in the course of history has an
autocracy willingly conceded power to the people - some sort of electoral reform is
overdue.
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Finally, delving into the schism between Christians and Muslims in Tibati might
prove out more contentious than that of state versus ethnicity. Looking into the schools,
traditional practices and whether political positions are unduly influenced by external
religious forces would be useful in understanding how the town operates.
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